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Abstract
The impact of schooling on wages decreases as employers learn about workers’ abilities
from their experience. While this employer learning often proceeds asymmetrically be-
tween incumbent and entrant employers, large firms’ internal labor markets could satisfy
the statistical assumption of the public learning model. This research utilizes such semi-
public properties and shows that (1) employer learning is not observed for experience
before gaining long-term employment, being dominated by complementarity between
schooling experience, and (2) the employer learning effect dominates the complementar-
ity effect after gaining long-term employment; the internal labor market affects workers’
human capital investment and asymmetrically facilitates employer learning.
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The employer learning model established by Farber and Gibbons (1996) clearly predicts
that the impact of schooling on wage decreases during workers’ experience in the labor mar-
ket as employers “publicly” learn about workers’ abilities, which are hidden when the workers
join the competitive labor market. This learning effect is captured by the non-increasing co-
efficient of the interaction term of schooling and experience in a wage regression, and the
empirical results of Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Altonji and Pierret (2001) evidenced the
prediction, followed by supporting works concerning the US labor market.1
Meanwhile, the public employer learning model has been questioned by the diverse reality
of the labor market. An approach to address the reality is explicit extension of modeling
toward asymmetry in employer learning, as suggested by Pinkston (2009). At the same time,
a potentially major example of asymmetric employer learning appears to be in internal labor
markets of large firms, within which the primary elements of statistical assumptions of the
public learning model are maintained, while internal labor markets themselves are shielded
from the outside market. This research intends to extend the scope of the public employer
leaning model to study employer learning under such semi-public conditions.
Empirical results here, based on micro data from a Japanese manufacturing firm, show
that employer learning is not observed for work experience before employees gain long-term
employment with the firm but is observed after the gain long-term employment with the firm.
This result is presumed to be due to changes in workers’ attitudes toward human capital in-
vestment and the strongly asymmetric learning effect between short-term employment and
long-term employment. This paper addresses the mechanism by splitting work experience
into the experience before and the experience after gaining long-term employment with the
case firm. By doing so, it examines a specific effect of internal labor markets on employer
learning.
Section 1 reviews related literature, and focuses attention on employer learning in internal
labor markets. Section 2 suggests semi-public properties of internal labor markets under which
wages are competitively determined, employees’ records are continuously accumulated, and
arbitrage with the outside market does not occur on the equilibrium path and thus the public
employer learning model is allowed to be applied. Then it presents the estimation model that
separates work experience into before gaining long-term employment with the firm and after
gaining such employment. Our semi-public approach intends, with maintaining tractability
of the public employer learning model by Farber and Gibbons (1996), to inquire employer
learning in internal labor markets. By doing so, the asymmetric reality of employer learning
in the labor market as a whole is expected to be captured without the expense of tractability.
Section 3 describes the data and then, verifies the existence of the internal labor market
at the case firm. Section 4 presents the empirical results, which show that short-term work
experience at younger ages and schooling were complements and do not support the employer
learning hypothesis, and that work experience after gaining long-term employment strongly
supports the employer learning hypothesis. The internal labor market both induced investment
in firm-specific human capital and facilitated employer learning.
1See Farber and Gibbons (1996); Altonji and Pierret (2001); Pinkston (2006); Lange (2007); and Oyer
(2008).
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1 Review of employer learning in internal labor markets
1.1 Symmetric employer learning questioned
While abilities of individual workers is difficult to observe, a worker’s educational background
is an observable proxy nd is assumed to be correlated with the worker’s ability. This correla-
tion entices employers to statistically discriminate between employees based on the workers’
educational backgrounds; such statistical discrimination could lead to a considerable gap be-
tween wages and realized performance.2 Motivated by this screening hypothesis, the rich
empirical results supporting the “sheepskin effects” of schooling have been presented for the
United States and several other economies.3 While schooling could surely enhance produc-
tivity, and not merely serve as a signal,4 “sheepskin effects” have been established to exist
in some form in developed, in developing, even in planned economies and hence basically
everywhere. Thus, the literature has begun to address how the effects differ depending on the
institutional arrangements. The public “employer learning” model established by Farber and
Gibbons (1996) focused on how the “sheepskin effects” decrease as employers learn about
workers’ abilities.
Farber and Gibbons (1996) assumed that incumbent and entrant employers symmetrically
learn workers’ abilities in the competitive market for tractability of the model and presented
consistent empirical evidence. However, this symmetric employer learning hypothesis has
been empirically questioned on two primary bases.
The first is the reality of asymmetry in employer learning, which is suggested by Galindo-
Rueda (2003), Scho¨nberg (2007), and especially Pinkston (2009), who explicitly modeled
asymmetric employer learning. While explicit modeling is theoretically allegiant, in some
cases in which asymmetric learning is observed, statistical assumptions of symmetric learning
are maintained. A typical case is internal labor markets of major firms. Establishments within
a large firm compete each other, and employees do not leave because of quasi-rent in their
wages which is return on the employees’ firm-specific human capital on the equilibrium. Then,
as discussed below, statistical assumptions of the public learning model by Farber and Gibbons
(1996) are retained within the internal labor market, and we can capitalize on tractability of
the public learning model to study wage growth asymmetric between inside and outside the
internal labor market.
The other issue concerns the workers’ attitudes toward human capital investment. The
non-increasing coefficient of the interaction term between schooling and experience, the in-
2See Hansen, Weisbrod and Scanlon (1970); Spence (1973); Arrow (1973); Tabman and Wales (1973); and
Stiglitz (1975).
3For the United States, the supporting evidence includes Riley (1979); Lang and Kropp (1987); Hungerford
and Solon (1987); Belman and Heywood (1991); Jaeger and Page (1996); Tyler, Murnane and Willett (2000);
Bedard (2001); Pinkston (2003); Bollinger and Hirsch (2006); and Clark and Jaeger (2006). For Japan, while
Bauer, Dross and Haisken-DeNew (2005), pp. 323-331 denied the “sheepskin effect,” this research provides the
opposite result. For the United Kingdom, see McGuinnes (2003); and Silles (2008). For Canada, see Ferrer and
Riddell (2002); and Caponi and Plesca (2009). For Spain, see Pons and Blanco (2005). For the Czech Republic,
which is a transition economy, see Mu¨nich, Svejnar and Terrell (2005).
4See Card and Krueger (1992); Groot and Oosterbeek (1994); and Dale and Krueger (2002).
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dicator of employer learning effect, also implies that that the complementarity effect between
schooling and experience is weak enough to be dominated by the employer learning effect,5
a relationship that does not seem to always hold as industrial economies have experienced
technology-skill/education complementary development since the early twentieth century as
presented by Goldin and Katz (2008). For instance, Bauer and Haisken-DeNew (2001) showed
that the interaction term between schooling and work experience has a significantly positive
coefficient for the German data set and concluded that employer learning is not observed in
the German labor market. While Lluis (2005) then mined certain certain evidence of employer
learning from the same data set by controlling for job-rank effects, the evidence is still more
weakly observed than the US cases.
1.2 Human capital investment and employer learning
While the educational background of workers has emerged as an important proxy of ability
in workplaces exactly in the context of technology-skill/education complementarity since the
early twentieth century as emphasized by Goldin and Katz (2008), the extent of complementar-
ity between schooling and worker experience is largely affected by the extent of human capital
specificity, which depends on the institutional arrangements of the labor market. The German
labor market encourages concentration in industry-specific human capital, while the Japanese
labor market tends to investment in firm-specific human capital.6 Meanwhile, the US labor
market places more emphasis on industry-specificity than firm-specificity while firm-specific
human capital has a positive impact on the wage growth, staying between the German and the
Japanese markets but tending slightly toward the former.7
The extent of the schooling-experience complementarity could change also as the worker
ages. As Topel and Ward (1992) demonstrated for the US case, young workers typically have
several work experiences, so as to achieve better matching, before obtaining long-term em-
ployment.8 Considering that general or industry-specific human capital accumulated through
total work experience has a considerable impact on wage growth and that firm-specific human
capital accumulated through tenure also has a smaller but definite impact, early-acquired ex-
perience in several workplaces is supposed to contribute to general human capital, while later
long-term employment is supposed to contribute to firm-specific human capital. For the Ger-
man case, young workers are expected to typically invest in “portable” general human capital
as evidenced by regular job changes in the early stages of their careers, followed by gaining
into long-term employment.9
People in the competitive market, especially under short-term employment contracts, are
5See Farber and Gibbons (1996), p. 1017.
6See Dustmann and Meghir (2005), pp. 90-96; Altonji and Shakotko (1987), pp. 442-454; and Abe (2000),
pp. 261-264.
7See Altonji and Shakotko (1987), pp. 442-454; Topel (1991), pp. 166-172; Neal (1995), pp. 660-669;
Parent (2000), pp. 308-320; Weinberg (2001), pp. 236-247; Poletaev and Robinson (2008), pp. 402-413; and
Shaw and Lazear (2008), pp. 717-720.
8See Topel and Ward (1992), pp. 467-374, and also see Markey and Parks (1989), pp. 7-9, and Parado,
Caner and Wollf (2007), pp.445-447.
9See Dustmann and Meghir (2005), p. 79; and Gathmann and Scho¨nberg (2010), pp. 10-36.
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likely to choose work experiences that complement their schooling if the other conditions are
fixed. This strategy of human capital investment has become even more desirable since the
early twentieth century, as the technology-skill/education complementarity has become aug-
mented by the transition of the production process from artisanal shops to the factory system
and then to the continuous production system, under which not only white collar workers but
also blue collar workers became required to learn general skills at secondary schools.10
Under the technology-skill/education complementary development, workers are likely to
choose work experiences such that they invest in general human capital complementary to
their educational backgrounds at young ages. Thus, schooling and experience might be com-
plements in short-term work experiences at young ages. However, if the current employer
commits to long-term employment and internal promotion, that is, an internal labor market
policy, then the employee has incentives to invest in firm-specific human capital. Such firm-
specific human capital might be less complementary to schooling. The degree of technology-
skill/education complementarity could interact with the institutional arrangement in the labor
market, and accordingly, the employer learning process. The German labor market appears to
be designed as friendly to investment in human capital standardized at the industry level by
the apprentice system,11 as compared with the labor markets of the United States, the United
Kingdom,12 and Japan examined in this research.
Meanwhile, internal labor markets in practice serve as a device of employer learning by
current employers as presented by Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994b) and Eriksson and
Ortega (2006).13 In addition, asymmetric employer learning is not only supported by the
internal labor market but also strengthens it.14
While the coefficient of the interaction term between schooling and experience is a tractable
measure of employer learning, this also measures extent of human capital specificity. The
labor market diversity comprises an institutional framework that encourages human capital in-
vestment and an informational structure, such as that of internal labor markets, which enables
employers to learn about workers’ abilities. Therefore the interaction term between schooling
and experience is a focal point of comparative analysis of the diversified labor markets.
Following the classic employer learning model, Galindo-Rueda (2003), Scho¨nberg (2007),
and Pinkston (2009) are conscious of a possible asymmetry in employer learning. Bauer
and Haisken-DeNew (2001) address human capital investment complementary to schooling,
and Baker et al. (1994b), Lluis (2005) and Eriksson and Ortega (2006) examined the wage
dynamics of the internal labor markets. Connecting these three lines of reasoning, this research
attempts to distinguish the employer learning effects on wage growth both inside and outside
the internal labor market using panel data of the Japanese steel industry from the period when
the the internal labor market policy was formed.
10See Fallon and Layard (1975), p. 295; Goldin and Katz (1996), pp. 253-256; Goldin and Katz (1998), pp.
698-719; Autor, Katz and Kearney (2006), pp. 190-191; and Goldin and Katz (2008), pp.102-125, 176-181.
11See Dustmann and Meghir (2005), p. 79.
12See Galindo-Rueda (2003), pp. 8-17,
13See Baker et al. (1994b), pp. 952-953; and Eriksson and Ortega (2006), pp. 661-665.
14See Waldman (1984); and Greenwald (1986).
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1.3 Internal labor markets
The internal labor markets characterized by long-term employment and internal promotion are
widely observed for highly skilled workers of large companies in developed economies when
the firm knows the necessary skills well and the skills are complementary to each other and/or
firm-specific. The empirical and descriptive works on the issue in the last two decades have
suggested that the internal labor market is an evaluation device to make the wages sensitive to
the employees’ performance through employer learning and to give the employees incentives
to invest in firm-specific human capital under asymmetric information between the employer
and employees.15
Japanese heavy manufacturing, as in the United States, began to form internal labor mar-
kets in the 1920s, and after the SecondWorld War, it became even more internal-labor-market-
oriented.16 Transition to the internal labor markets in long-existing major industries was ac-
companied by the dissolution of an autonomous intermediary labor organization into a labor
organization systematically planned and directly controlled by firms. Such a transition would
proceed with a technological transformation that provides the firms with informational advan-
tages in the acquisition of relevant human capital, making direct control by the firm relatively
efficient. As for the Japanese steel industry studied by this research, periods of technological
transition were observed in the 1920s and in the 1950s as larger open-hearth furnaces were
introduced, and in the 1960s, when converter furnaces were introduced. As with the US steel
industry, the core of the transition was to construct a work organization with a systematic wage
and promotion scheme.
This research addresses the wage growth of blue-collar employees from 1929 to 1969
in the Kamaishi Iron Works, one of the leading iron works then in Japan at that time, and
addresses employer learning and human capital specificity in wage dynamics during the for-
mation of the internal labor market.
2 Estimation model
2.1 Theoretical framework of symmetric employer learning
We begin with a theoretical framework of public employer learning, following Farber and
Gibbons (1996).17 Let yi;t denote the output of the ith worker, i = 1; : : : ; n, in the tth period,
t = 1; : : : ; T , i denote the ith worker’s ability that is not observable by employers when
the worker joins the labor market but is learned about by employers, yosi denote the years
of schooling the ith worker completed that is observable by employers, xi denote a vector
of time-invariant characteristics of the ith worker other than the years of schooling that are
15See Alexander (1974); Williamson, Wachter and Harris (1975); ; Rosen (1988); Aoki (1988), pp. 49-98;
Osterman (2011); Baker, Gibbs and Holmstrom (1994a), pp. 881-884; and Baker and Holmstrom (1995), pp.
256-257.
16See Hashimoto and Raisian (1985); Aoki (1988), pp. 59-69; Mincer and Higuchi (1988); Moriguchi (2003);
and Ono (2010).
17See Farber and Gibbons (1996), pp. 1010-1014.
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observable to employers and are included in the data, and zi denote a vector of time-invariant
characteristics of the ith worker that are observable by employers but are not included in the
data.
We assume that the conditional distribution G(yi;t j i; yosi;xi; zi) can be arbitrary and
that the outputs yi;t are independently drawn from G(yi;t j i; yosi;xi;zi). We also assume
the joint distribution F (i; yosi;xi;zi) can be arbitrary. All employers are assumed to know
F (i; yosi;xi;zi) and G(yi;t j i; yosi;xi; zi) and to observe yi;1; : : : ; yi;t. Thus both incum-
bent and entrant employers symmetrically learn about the ith employee’s ability in the market.
Finally, we assume that the wage paid to the ith worker in period t equals expected output
given all available information in period t about the worker,
(1) wi;t = E
 
yi;t j yosi;xi; zi; yi;1; : : : ; yi;t 1

;
which is realized by the competition between employers. We additionally assume that the
conditional expectation E
 
yi;t j yosi;xi; zi; yi;1; : : : ; yi;t 1

is a linear combination of yosi,
xi, zi, and yi;1; : : : ; yi;t 1.
2.2 Example of public employer learning as a benchmark
We next review an example of the employer learning model to fit to the random effect estima-
tion. Consider a random effect model of the panel least square regression of the ith employee’s
wage at time t, wi;t, with xi, which is anm  2 dimensional vector whose factors are observ-
able characteristics included in data other than the years of schooling and are numbered from
3,
(2) wi;t = 0 + 1yosi + 2yosi  t+ 3x3;i +   + jxj;i +   + mxm;i + i + i;t;
where the stochastic variable i captures the time-invariant characteristics unobserved by the
employer.
Furthermore,
(3) twi;t = 2yosi +tE(i j yosi; xi) +ti;t  2yosi + 'i;t;
where ti;t is the serially independent innovation.
Then, the linear projection of w, which is an n dimensional vector whose ith factor is wi,
denoted by E(w j ), yields18
E(w jX) =X^;
whereX is a nmmatrix whose ith row is the ith workers’ characteristics and the jth column
is the jth independent variable in wage equation (2). Normal equations give,
(4) ^ = [X 0X] 1X 0w;
18Note that E(y j yos;x;z) = E(y j yos;x; z) because E is assumed to be linear.
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where the jth factor of ^, ^j is increasing in the numerator,
PT
t=1
Pn
i=1 xj;iwi;t. The numera-
tor is the only combination including w, and thus variation of interaction between observable
characteristics and w is involved only in the numerator.
Therefore, with other conditions controlled for, ^2 is increasing in
PT
t=1
Pn
i=1(yosi t)
wi;t and hence is increasing in the value standardized by a non-stochastic number TnE(yos
t)E(w),
PT
t=1
Pn
i=1(yosi t)wi;t TnE(yos t)E(w) = Cov(yosi t; wi;t). In addition,
from equation (3), we have
(5) Cov(yosi  t; wi;t) =
TX

Cov(yosi  ; 'i; )
It is important to note thatCov(yosi;tt; wi;t) contains a two-dimensional effect composed
of the cross-sectional effect over workers i = 1; : : : ; n and the longitudinal effect over period
t = 1; : : : ; T .
In the cross-sectional dimension, Cov(yos ; ' ) is increasing in the degree of comple-
mentarity between schooling (yos) and work experience ( ) for each  ( = 2; : : : ; T ). The
covariance between w and yos   should be positive in the cross-sectional dimension of
workers i = 1; : : : ; n if schooling (yos) and experience ( ) are complements for productivity
difference () and non-positive otherwise for each period t.
In the longitudinal dimension, let us assume that the employers have learned about the
employees’ hidden characteristics when recruiting, which are captured by i, and that i ap-
proaches a stationary state at some point t such that E(i j yosi;    1) is decreasing in
  t andE(i j yosi;    1) = 0 for  > t. Then Cov(yosi ; 'i) is decreasing in   t
and Cov(yosi  t; 'i) = 0 for  > t for each i. Thus, Cov(yosi  ; wit) is decreasing for
t  t and 0 for t > t in the longitudinal dimension over t for each individual worker i.
Hence, in the antilogarithmic specification, if the employer learning effect in the longitu-
dinal dimension dominates the complementary effect between schooling and experience in the
cross-sectional dimension, ^2 should be non-positive. Suppose that the wages, with marginal
productivity, increase over experience, and then take the logarithmic expression of all vari-
ables.19 Then, ^2 depends on the relative impact of the effect of complementarity between
schooling and work experience and the effect of employer learning. Therefore, a) if the for-
mer effect dominates the latter, then ^2 > 0; and b) if the latter effect dominates the former,
then ^2 < 0.
2.3 Semi-public employer learning in internal labor markets
Next suppose an internal labor market of a multi-unit firm,20 in which plural units compete
each other, return on firm-specific human capital is positive, thus the quasi-rent of firm-
specific human capital is positive, therefore employees do not leave on the equilibrium path,
and so arbitrage of wages between inside and outside of the firm does not occur. Then, we
19For tractability, in this research, the regressors are also logarithmically transformed to allow the experience
and tenure effects to be marginally decreasing instead of the squared terms of the antilogarithmic level.
20We typically assume the one described by Chandler (1977), pp. 1-12.
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can assume that all the units within the firm symmetrically know G(yi;t j i; yosi;xi;zi)
and F (i; yosi;xi; zi) for i = 1; : : : ; n and t = 1; : : : ; T , and observe yi;1; : : : ; yi;t. That
is, all the units continuously learn employees’ abilities, the wage growth depends on the
units’ learning without arbitrage with the outside market, and the competitive situation guar-
antees wi;t = E(yi;t j ). While wages are competitively determined and employees’ abil-
ities are symmetrically learned about within the internal labor market, trajectories of wage
growth are asymmetric between inside and outside the internal labor market because em-
ployees do not leave due to quasi-rent earned from firm specific-human capital and thus
G(yi;t j i; yosi;xi; zi) and F (i; yosi;xi;zi) remain unknown to outside employers. We
define these properties as semi-public.
Workers are expected to invest in general human capital at both school and workplace if
their employers do not commit to long-term employment. Meanwhile, employees would will-
ingly invest in firm-specific human capital if their employers commit to long-term employ-
ment, and if quasi-rent from firm-specific human capital is positive.. Furthermore, long-term
employment also helps current employers learn about their employees’ abilities.
To capture this effect of the internal labor market, we simply separate the ith employee’s
experience into two components, such that t = exp = pre+ten, where exp is total experience,
pre is work experience prior to joining the firm, and ten is tenure at the firm. Then, the wage
equation (2) can be reformulated as
wi;t = 0 + 1yosi
+ 2yosi  pre + 3yosi  ten
+ 4exp + 5ten + 
Txi + 
Txi  ten + i + i;t:
(6)
Recall that xi represents the vector of time-invariant characteristics other than educational
background.
A critical condition of the semi-public properties is that return on firm-specific human
capital is sufficiently large to prevent employees from deviating the internal labor market on
the equilibrium. Thus, significantly positive coefficient of ten, 5 > 0, is necessary.
While the complementarity between schooling and work experience is greater during
shorter-term employment in the earlier stages of workers’ careers, employers learn about
workers’ abilities better in longer-term employment. Then, taking the logarithmic specifi-
cation, the prediction from employer learning combined with workers’ concerns about invest-
ment in human capital is as follows:
Prediction 1. The coefficient of the interaction term between the years of schooling and pre-
vious experience before employment with a firm that commits to the long-term employment
(yos pre) is expected to be greater than the interaction term between the years of schooling
and the tenure after employment with the firm (yos ten); thus ^2 > ^3.
Then we need a sample set that satisfies the semi-public properties discussed above.
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3 Case firm and data
3.1 The Kamaishi Iron Works: Historical context
The Kamaishi Iron Works opened by the Nambu Domain in 1857 is the oldest modern iron
works in Japan. After being nationalized in 1873 and privatized again in 1884, new blast
furnaces were built, and the integrated production of pig iron and steel began in 1903. After
ownership from 1924 to 1934 by theMitsui Holdings, then the largest conglomerate, Kamaishi
Iron Works was merged with other major iron works in 1934 to form Nippon Iron and Steel in
1934 under the governmental coordination.
After the Second World War, Nippon Iron and Steel was split into Fuji and Yawata under
the US occupation. After the US occupation, steel companies and other important manu-
facturing companies were induced to invest in new technology with the long-term financing
coordinated by the government from the 1950s to the 1960s. For Kamaishi Iron Works, then
part of Fuji, this coordinated modernization effort emphasized efficiency improvements in iron
and steel production but the replacement of old blast furnaces was not planned.
A large change during the modernization post-1950s of the production lines was the stan-
dardization, or “manualization,” of the production procedures. Before the Second World War,
in the iron and steel industry, sophisticated production procedures were developed by em-
ployees and taught to the younger employees by the senior employees of the company. After
the 1950s, however, the production line procedures became manualized by better-educated
engineers, and the best practices at the shop floor came to be known to the firm.21
As part of a company-wide investment plan, Fuji decided to build a new state-of-the-art
plant Tokai in Nagoya, a large city distant from Kamaishi. The firm also decided to decrease
Kamaishi’s capacity, to increase the capacity of other new plants such as Tokai, and to relocate
the skilled workers of Kamaishi and other old iron works to Tokai. Consequently, 1,678 skilled
workers moved from Kamaishi to Tokai in 1964, 1967, 1968, and 1969.22
This brief history mentions that Fuji constituted a rigorous internal labor market, iron
works within the company competed each other, and the firm-specific human capital was
commonly productive in different iron works within the same company, and hence the data
set is appropriate sample in terms of our semi-public properties.
3.2 Data
This research uses the preserved panel data of wages for 1,544 relocated Kamaishi employees,
tracking them from the late 1920s or later, depending on the employee, to the 1960s, when
they left Kamaishi. The number of total observations is 24,022. Selection for relocation was
handled in cooperation with the union, and in principle, anyone who was willing to move was
21See Nakamura (2010), pp. 8-21.
22In addition to the 1,678 workers from Kamaishi, 908 workers moved from Muroran, 972 workers moved
from Hirohata, and 127 workers moved from Kawasaki. See Umezaki (2010), pp. 33-38. Fuji and Yawata
merged into the Nippon Steel in 1970s and both Kamaishi and Tokai, which was renamed as Nagoya, have since
belonged to Nippon Steel.
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allowed to be relocated. Thus, the measure of selection was just the employees’ willingness.23
The data set has advantages specifically with regard to this research. The original person-
nel documents contain all important employee information from when they were employed.
We are able to recover employees’ entire lives from when they were born to when they were
relocated in the late 1960s. In addition, the record itself implies that the firm learned about
employees’ abilities through experience and job assignment.
Each individual wage record includes:
1. Educational background (yos).
2. Physiological characteristics when employed: height (hgt), weight and lung capacity.
3. Panel data of training, promotion, wage and personal information:
(1) The record of whether the employee any of the following in-house training:
 Systematic programs for elected employees
1927-1935: “Youth Development Center (Seinen Kunrenjo)” (ydc); three
days a week, 4 years, 800 hours in total.
1935-1948: “School for Youth (Seinen Gakko)” (sy); half-time, three days a
week, 4 years.
1939-1946: “Development Center for Technicians (Ginosha Yoseijo)” (dct);
full-time, 3 years, 6,453 hours in total.
1946-1973: “Development Center (Kyoshujo)” (dc); three days a week, 2
years (by 1950), 6 days a week (from 1950).
 Short term programs (for example, elementary calculus).
(2) Licenses the employee held.
(3) Family composition.
(4) Clinical history.
(5) Basic wages.
(6) Promotion and deployment: classes, division, and department assignment, and job
assignment.
The panel data of the basic wage begin when the employee joined the firm and end when
he moved to the Tokai Iron Works, varying from 1964 to 1969.
The composition of the cohorts is as shown in Table 1. An especially important feature
of the data set is that it is not dominated by those who were employed immediately after
graduation, in contrast with contemporary Japanese firms. Employing mainly new graduates,
the common recruitment policy of contemporary major Japanese firms, has become prevalent
for blue-collar workers since the early 1970s and was not common before that. The mean of
previous experience (years after graduating from school and before employment with the firm,
pre) is not even monotonically decreasing.
23See Umezaki (2010), pp.47-49.
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From the late nineteenth century, when heavy manufacturing was introduced from the
Western world, the career pattern that involved gaining experience at several workplaces to
acquire the relevant skills and then either gaining employment with a large firm on a long-term
basis or starting one’s own workshop became typical for male skilled workers. This tradition is
well exploited by this research strategy in the form of equation (6). Also, the empirical results
of this research could be compared with those obtained from the other industrial economies.
Compulsory education was extended from 6 years to 9 years in 1947. Therefore, in Table
1, the difference in educational background across the employees who graduated before 1947
is distributed mainly between those with 6 years who spent attending mandatory elementary
schools and those with 8 years who attended an additional 2-year high elementary school,
with high elementary school graduates as the majority. The difference in the employees who
graduated after 1947 is distributed mainly between the those who spent 9 mandatory years
attending a 6-year elementary school and a 3-year junior high school and those who spent
12 years attending an additional 3-year high school, with junior high school graduates as the
majority.
3.3 Verifying the existence of the internal labor market
Before estimating equation (6), the existence of the internal labor market policy, which some-
how “shields” wage determination from the outside market, is to be empirically established.
We follow the strategy presented by Baker et al. (1994b).
If a firm offers competitive wages with respect to the observable signals such as the ed-
ucational background in the market when recruiting, and if the firm adopts the internal labor
market policy under which wages are determined based on the internal rules that more or less
shield the internal wage dynamics from the market price, then the wage growth of each cohort
preserves the trace of the outside market pricing only at the point of recruitment; it is shielded
from the market price thereafter, and could share a common traits. Thus, the survival of the
cohort effect is a useful indicator of the existence of the internal labor market.24
Table 2 contains regressions of real daily wages (rw) on experience in the labor mar-
ket (exp), tenure (ten), the 2-year joined dummies such as yj1928   1929, yj1930   1931,
yj1932  1933, etc., and the interactions between the 2-year joined dummies and tenure such
as (yj1928 1929)ten, (yj1930 1931)ten, (yj1932 1933)ten, etc. To control for the
effect of educational background, the years of schooling (yos) is also inserted as a regressor.
The period saw a rapid growth in average productivity, which is controlled for by the year
dummies. In model 2-2, to allow the cohort effect to be decreasing in tenure, the interaction
term of the 2-year joined dummies and tenure (yj  ten), rather than (ten), is inserted as a
regressor.25 The cohort effects survive among the employees of all cohorts. The internal labor
24See Baker et al. (1994b), pp. 923, 933-940 and Baker and Holmstrom (1995), pp. 258-259.
25Our approach differs from that of Baker et al. (1994b) in some important regards. To avoid the identification
difficulty and still extract the cohort effect, Baker et al. (1994b) assumed that the tenure effect on wage growth is
linear, estimated the coefficient of the linear regression of wages on tenure, deducted the estimated tenure effect
from the cohort average wage, and regressed this adjusted cohort average wage on the cohort dummies. However,
in this data set, as the decreasing impact of past wages on the current wage in Table 3 shows, the tenure effect is
not linear. Hence, to avoid the identification problem, we simply bind the adjacent two cohorts together into one
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market at the Kamaishi Iron Works seems to have been formed in the 1930s. This statistical
inference is consistent with the descriptive picture based on documents and hearings.26
As Baker et al. (1994b) described, the serial correlation of wage growth is another useful
indicator of the internal labor market.27 In the competitive market in which wage increments
are serially independent, the wage history should have a unit root and be a random walk.
However the result would be different in an internal labor market. For this case firm, wage
histories are serially correlated, the probability of a common panel unit root of rw in the level
term is statistically rejected, and an individual panel unit root of the first difference of rw
(rw) is also rejected.28 Therefore each trajectory of individual wage growth rwten is a
contraction mapping, has a unique fixed point, and is moving toward the unique fixed point.
The steady state to which each wage history verges is supposed to be the true value of the
employee’s hidden ability. If the employer, for instance, uses the accumulated information for
the assignment of employees, then such a regularly serial correlation can be observed 29
Meanwhile, these trajectories differ over cohorts. Table 3 regresses the real wage rwten
on the interaction terms of the 2-year joined dummy and the first and second lagged terms
such as (yj1928   1929)  log rwten 1, (yj1930   1931)  log rwten 1, (yj1932   1933) 
log rwten 1, etc., (yj1928   1929)  log rwten 2, (yj1930   1931)  log rwten 2, (yj1932  
1933)  log rwten 2, etc. Though the results look similar, significantly different wage curves
are observed even between adjacent cohorts. This result implies that we need to carefully
control for the cohort effects to examine Prediction 1 in section 2.3.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Overview: Tenure, employer learning, and in-house training
Before directly proceeding to the estimation of equation (6), let us give an overview based
on the ordinary regression equation (2) as a benchmark. Table 4 gives the results of the ran-
dom effect estimation regressing real wage (rw) on employee height when employed by the
firm (hgt),30 the years of schooling (yos), total experience in the labor market (exp), tenure
at the firm (ten), the interaction of height and total experience (hgt exp), the interaction of
height and tenure (hgt  ten), the interaction of the years of schooling and total experience
(yos exp), the interaction of the years of schooling and tenure (yos ten), the dummy vari-
ables of completing in-house training programs, Development Center for Youth (dcy, operated
group and then regress the wages on the dummies of the two-cohort groups.
26See Umezaki (2010), pp. 42-51.
27See Baker et al. (1994b), pp. 943-953.
28Common panel unit root test (Levin, Lin and Chu test) of rw: t statistic:  11:0441, cross sections
included: 1; 395, total panel observations: 20; 410. Individual panel unit root test (Im, Pesaran and Chin test) of
rw: W statistic:  60:8254, cross sections included: 1; 309, observations: 18; 419. Optimal lag is determined
by the Akaike Information Criterion, and  denotes significance at the 1 percentage level.
29See Baker et al. (1994b), pp. 924, 926-927, 952-954.
30To control for the improved nutrition throughout the period, we use relative height compared with average
height in the state statistics for estimation. Thus (observed height)/(average height at employee’s age in the year
from the Ministry of Education statistics) is used as “height (hgt).”
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in 1927-1935), School of Youth (sy, operated in 1935-1948), Development Center for Tech-
nicians (dct, operated in 1939-1946), and Development Center (dc, operated in 1946-1973),
and the interaction of these dummy variables and tenure (dcy  ten, sy  ten, dct  ten,
dc  ten).31 The potential impact of the extended compulsory schooling32 is captured by the
postwar education generation dummy (psw).
Significantly large coefficient of ten implies that return on the firm-specific human cap-
ital is considerable, which is consistent with our semi-public properties. Then the employer
learning hypothesis strongly holds. In Table 4, the interaction term of the years of schooling
with total work experience after graduation (yos exp) has significantly negative coefficients
in models 4-1 and 4-3, and that with tenure (yos ten) has significantly negative coefficients
in models 4-2 and 4-4.
Along with the years of schooling, proxies of the abilities observable to the employer are
physiological characteristics such as height. In the case of blue-collar workers in the steel
industry, physical strength was critical, and height is a good proxy of such physical strength.
Indeed, with regard to height, the employer learning hypothesis holds. The interaction term of
height with tenure (hgt ten) has a significantly negative coefficient in models 4-3 and 4-4.
Table 4 also shows that the role of training programs changed throughout the sample
period. The interaction of the postwar program with tenure (dc  ten) has a significantly
negative coefficient while the interaction terms of the prewar programs with tenure (dcy 
ten; sy  ten; dct  ten) have significantly positive coefficients in models 4-1, 4-2, 4-3, and
4-4. The change in the sign of the interaction terms with tenure from the prewar programs
to the postwar program indicates that the prewar program contents were complementary with
tenure, while the postwar program contents became substitutes.
4.2 Internal labor market effect
Next, we examine equation (6) and Prediction 1. The first approach comprising a straight-
forward specification without control for the cohort effect by the random effect estimation is
presented in Table 5. The coefficient of ten, 5 in equation (6), is significantly positive with
large absolute value, indicating that the return on the firm-specific human capital is consid-
erable, which is consistent with our semi-public properties. With the changes in return on
schooling controlled for by inserting the interaction between the year dummy and the years of
schooling (dy  yos), the interaction term between the years of schooling and previous work
experience (yos  pre, 2 in equation (6)) has a significantly positive coefficient, differing
from the symmetric employer learning hypothesis. In contrast, the interaction term between
the years of schooling and tenure (yos ten. 3 in (6)) has a significantly negative coefficient,
implying that Prediction 1 holds, ^2 > ^3.
Similar but different wage curves in Table 3 urge us to control for the cohort effects when
checking robustness of the results in Table 5. Therefore, Table 6 presents a regression of the
real wage (rw) with random effects on the years of schooling (yos), work experience after
graduation and before employment with the firm (pre), tenure after employment with the firm
31Some samples lack the information on height, weight, and lung capacity.
32See Oreopoulos (2005), pp. 158-170.
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(ten), and motivated by the Table 3, the interaction terms of the 2-year joined dummy, the
years of schooling and previous work experience before employment with the firm, (yj1928 
1929) yos pre, (yj1930  1931) yos pre, etc., and the interaction terms of the 2-year
joined dummy, the years of schooling, and tenure, (yj1928   1929)  yos  ten, (yj1930  
1931) yos ten, etc., to control for the cohort effects on the interaction between schooling
and work experience. Table 6 also controls for the training programs (dcy, sy, dct, dc), the
interactions between the training programs and tenure (dcyten, syten, dctten, dcten),
and the interactions between the year dummy and the years of schooling (dy yos) to capture
the changes in the return on schooling during the period.
Then, the interaction term between the years of schooling and previous work experience
(yos  pre, 2) again has a significantly positive coefficient, differing from the symmetric
employer learning hypothesis and supporting Prediction 1, while the interaction term between
the years of schooling and tenure (yos ten, 3) has a significantly negative coefficient, thus
^2 > ^3, supporting Prediction 1. The feature showed in Table 5 was uniformly shared
among all cohorts; its results are robust.
4.3 Employer learning and human capital investment
An immediate interpretation of the results in Table 5 and Table 6, considering that employees
had previously acquired experience for several years on average in Table 1, is that the workers
had chosen the workplace experience in the initial phases of their careers given their edu-
cational backgrounds such that the experience was complementary to their schooling before
gaining employment with the firm, and after gaining employment with the firm, invested in
firm-specific human capital not necessarily complementary to schooling, as thereafter the firm
also learned about their abilities not informed by the educational backgrounds. The workers
invested in general human capital at schools and workplaces before they joined the internal
labor market, and they turned to investment in human capital less complementary to schooling
after they joined the firm.
While the regression of wages on the interaction term between the years of schooling and
total work experience (yosexp) in Table 4 suggests that employer learning holds, the results
in Table 5 and Table 6 indicate that the coefficient of the interaction term between the years of
schooling and total work experience (yos exp) could be divided into two parts—before and
after gaining employment with the firm (yos  pre, yos  ten)—signs of whose coefficients
^2 and ^3 have opposite signs.
The interaction term between the years of schooling and total work experience (yos 
exp) in Table 4 supports employer learning because the long-term employer learned much
better after the employees were incorporated to the internal labor market. The coefficient
of the interaction term between the years of schooling and previous work experience (yos 
pre), ^2 is significantly positive in Table 5 and Table 6, while that between the years of
schooling and work experience after gaining employment with the firm (yos  ten), ^3 is
significantly negative. Because the latter effect is sufficiently large, the coefficient of the
interaction between the years of schooling and experience (yos exp) in Table 4 is negative.
The significantly negative coefficient of the interaction term between the years of schooling
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and experience (yos exp) seems to in fact capture the internal labor market effect.
The symmetric employer learning hypothesis assumed small significance of the comple-
mentarity between schooling and work experience in the workers’ young days. However, the
result here indicates that the learning effect does not dominate the complementary effect of
schooling and experience because the workers invested in general capital in their early stages
of career, a phenomenon that is observed for an even longer duration in the German case as
described by Bauer and Haisken-DeNew (2001). The result also shows that asymmetric em-
ployer learning is much more effective, as in the US and British cases presented by Pinkston
(2009) and Galindo-Rueda (2003), after the workers entered into long-term employment.
Table 6 also shows that the negativity of the coefficient of interaction between the years of
schooling and tenure (yosten) increases as the cohort comes closer to the end of the covered
period. First, the coefficients with larger negativity of cohorts closer to the end implies that the
learning effect had a larger impact in the earlier tenure in the internal labor markets as Lluis
(2005) inferred based on the German intra-firm data set.33 Second, given that the employer
learning effect shifts the coefficient of (yos  ten) in the antilogarithmic levels toward zero,
the negativity of the coefficient in the logarithmic specification hypothetically captures the
effect of wage growth from the increase in labor productivity. Because establishment-wide
productivity growth is controlled for by the interaction terms of the year dummy and the years
of schooling (yd  yos), the increase is attributed to the increase in the return on human
capital investment by individual employees. Then, the larger negativity of closer to the end
cohorts implies a wage increase marginally decreasing in tenure. Therefore Table 6 shows that
employer learning progresses in the earlier stages and return on investment in human capital
is also larger in earlier stages.
5 Conclusion: Implication of the empirical result
We have shown that employer learning is not observed in previous work experience before the
workers gained long-term employment with the firm, the stage when they invested in general
human capital complementary to schooling, and that employer learning is clearly observed
once they gained long-term employment in our case of the Japanese steel industry from the
1930s to the 1960s. The internal labor market directed workers to investment in more specific
human capital and accelerated employer learning.
After the public employer learning model was established by Farber and Gibbons (1996),
the recent results for the United States, German, and British cases have suggested that more
research is required on the asymmetric learning by current employers (Pinkston (2009), Lluis
(2005), and Galindo-Rueda (2003)). While explicit modeling of asymmetry in employer learn-
ing is a promising approach, not a few cases that provide asymmetric reality of employer
learning in fact can be described under the same theoretical framework as the public employer
learning model by Farber and Gibbons (1996). A typical example is internal labor markets
33See Lluis (2005), pp. 745-755. With other conditions controlled for, quick learning in early stage is also
observed in the United States. See Gibbons, Katz, Lemieux and Parent (2005), pp. 698-714, and Lange (2007),
pp. 9-19.
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of large firms. Empirical evidence presented by Baker et al. (1994b), Gibbons et al. (2005),
Lluis (2005), and Eriksson and Ortega (2006) does not contradict the assumption that em-
ployer learning asymmetrically proceeds between inside and outside an internal labor market,
but symmetrically proceeds within the internal labor market. Relying on the semi-public prop-
erties, we can extend our study on employer learning without expense of great tractability of
the model by Farber and Gibbons (1996), as shown in this research.
While excessive generalization of this Japanese experience might not be conducive, long-
term employment is observed and has a positive impact on wages and job protection in US
workplaces to encourage the accumulation of industry-, firm-, and/or skill-specific human
capital.34 In addition, since the 1930s, the wages in the United States have been even more
shielded to the macroeconomic shocks owing to the institutional settings of the labor market
and implicit contracts within internal labor markets.35 Prevalence of internal labor markets,
captured as cohort effects persistent in the labor market, is observed in the United States, Ger-
many, and Canada as in Japan.36 Internal labor markets of major firms in developed economies
are naturally thought to affect the wage dynamics in the labor market.
The extent of the asymmetry in employer learning and the extent of the complementarity
between schooling and experience can vary over economies. Employer learning is slightly
more asymmetric in the United Kingdom than in the United States.37 Meanwhile, invest-
ment in human capital in Germany seems to concentrate in industry-specificity instead of
firm-specificity more than in the US labor market. If skill is highly standardized within each
industry and if compulsory schooling and the apprenticeship system are seamlessly connected,
then schooling and work experience would be highly complementary.38
As compared to the previous evidence for the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Germany, the result of this research suggests that the Japanese labor market in the first half of
the twentieth century was closer to the contemporary British market than to the contemporary
US market in terms of the symmetry of informational structure for employer learning, and
closer to the contemporary US market than to the contemporary German market in terms of
the comparative emphasis on the industry- or firm-specificity of human capital investment.
To proceed with such a comparative analysis on the interaction between the firm organiza-
tion and the labor market, further inquiry based on the intra-firm panel data of employees who
work for specific large firms, which theoretically enables application of the public employer
learning model and tractable comparison.
34See Parent (1999), pp. 305-315; Weinberg (2001), pp. 236-251; Poletaev and Robinson (2008), pp. 400-
413; Shaw and Lazear (2008), pp. 717-720.
35See Gordon (1982), pp. 18-42; Beaudry and DiNardo (1991), pp. 675-685; and Dohmen (2004), pp.
746-752.
36For the US, see Kahn (2010); and Genda, Kondo and Ohta (2010); for Germany, see von Wachter and
Bender (2006, 2008); for Canada, see Oreopoulos, von Wachter and Heisz (2012); and for Japan, see Genda et
al. (2010).
37See Galindo-Rueda (2003) pp. 13-15; Scho¨nberg (2007), pp. 672-675; and Pinkston (2009), pp. 381-389.
38For the United States, see Weinberg (2001), pp.236-247; and for Germany, see Bauer and Haisken-DeNew
(2001), pp.l66-177; Dustmann and Meghir (2005), pp. 90-96; Dustmann and Pereira (2008), pp. 383-388; and
Pischke and von Wachter (2008), pp. 596-598.
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Table 1 Emplyee numbers, years of schooling, and previous experience across cohorts.
max min median mean max min median mean
yj1928 1 35 9 9 9 9.00 3 3 3 3.00
yj1929 1 38 8 8 8 8.00 1 1 1 1.00
yj1930 1 34 8 8 8 8.00 2 2 2 2.00
yj1931 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
yj1932 0 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
yj1933 3 92 8 8 8 8.00 5 2 2 2.75
yj1934 2 62 8 6 6 6.94 11 5 5 7.81
yj1935 5 158 8 8 8 8.00 9 1 1 3.94
yj1936 7 220 8 8 8 8.00 9 1 6 5.77
yj1937 7 214 8 6 8 7.74 12 1 8 6.51
yj1938 18 534 8 6 8 7.54 13 0 6 5.30
yj1939 41 1,175 8 6 8 7.91 13 0 5 5.15
yj1940 43 1,196 8 6 8 7.81 12 0 6 5.29
yj1941 44 1,162 9 6 8 7.88 13 0 4 4.70
yj1942 31 788 9 6 8 7.71 16 0 2 4.33
yj1943 25 605 9 0 8 7.61 14 0 3 4.39
yj1944 27 626 8 0 8 7.42 16 0 2 4.44
yj1945 18 399 8 6 8 7.78 3 0 1 0.85
yj1946 19 388 8 6 8 7.78 22 0 1 3.37
yj1947 12 226 8 6 8 7.84 3 0 1 0.89
yj1948 293 5,664 12 6 8 8.01 23 0 9 9.64
yj1949 266 4,795 12 6 8 8.05 21 0 8 8.64
yj1950 38 634 12 6 9 8.38 26 0 6 5.83
yj1951 54 889 9 6 8 7.66 21 5 9 9.41
yj1952 7 105 9 6 8 7.82 10 5 7 7.31
yj1953 13 154 12 9 9 9.16 4 0 3 2.77
yj1954 19 238 12 9 9 9.79 3 0 3 2.31
yj1955 11 124 9 9 9 9.00 3 2 3 2.88
yj1956 93 973 12 7 9 8.81 20 1 7 7.43
yj1957 71 657 12 6 9 8.90 18 0 6 7.03
yj1958 26 199 9 9 9 9.00 9 2 3 3.10
yj1959 89 610 14 8 9 10.08 15 0 3 3.84
yj1960 46 265 12 8 9 10.19 26 0 3 4.85
yj1961 37 161 12 9 9 9.15 12 1 3 4.07
yj1962 89 312 12 8 12 10.73 9 0 2 2.08
yj1963 43 117 12 0 9 7.60 36 2 12 10.30
yj1964 17 88 9 6 8 8.13 35 2 20 20.63
yj1965 9 35 12 8 12 11.09 5 1 1 1.91
yj1966 10 31 12 12 12 12.00 13 0 1 2.06
yj1967 8 19 12 9 9 10.42 14 1 5 6.47
total 1,544 24,022
Notes : Previous experience: Years after graduating school, before employed by the firm.
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Table 2 Cohort effect in panel estimations.
2-1 2-2
Estimation method panel least squares
Dependent variable log(rw)
Cross-section pooled (no cross-section dummy)
Period (year) fixed (year dummies inserted)
Indepedent variables coefficient t  statistic coefficient t statistic
c 0.4680 25.0154 ** -0.2692 -5.3959 **
log(yos) 0.1396 31.7046 ** 0.1372 31.6735 **
log(exp) 0.2116 112.8607 ** 0.2087 111.7480 **
log(ten) 0.0349 17.2919 **
yj1930-1931 -0.0331 -1.5826 0.1614 3.0335 **
yj1932-1933 -0.0488 -3.1105 ** 0.0275 0.7193
yj1934-1935 -0.0752 -5.4992 ** 0.0937 2.7562 **
yj1936-1937 -0.0924 -7.0411 ** 0.0986 2.8601 **
yj1938-1939 -0.1171 -9.3742 ** 0.0786 2.2733 *
yj1940-1941 -0.1575 -12.6004 ** 0.1100 3.0945 **
yj1942-1943 -0.1990 -15.6638 ** 0.1298 3.5129 **
yj1944-1945 -0.2690 -20.8844 ** 0.0929 2.4309 *
yj1946-1947 -0.3049 -23.0515 ** 0.0810 2.0336 *
yj1948-1949 -0.3176 -24.9450 ** 0.1468 3.6206 **
yj1950-1951 -0.3907 -29.8522 ** 0.1254 2.9612 **
yj1952-1953 -0.4265 -29.9381 ** 0.1681 3.7131 **
yj1954-1955 -0.4467 -31.5828 ** 0.2185 4.7186 **
yj1956-1957 -0.5752 -42.2726 ** 0.1104 2.3354 *
yj1958-1959 -0.6238 -43.9963 ** 0.1559 3.1455 **
yj1960-1961 -0.6643 -44.8111 ** 0.1656 3.2143 **
yj1962-1963 -0.6663 -43.5349 ** 0.2260 4.2484 **
yj1964-1965 -0.6600 -38.8257 ** 0.2381 4.0795 **
yj1966-1967 -0.6611 -30.2358 ** 0.3515 4.6687 **
yj1928-1929×log(ten) 0.0293 16.2214 **
yj1930-1931×log(ten) 0.0214 8.9992 **
yj1932-1933×log(ten) 0.0314 18.7486 **
yj1934-1935×log(ten) 0.0289 19.9306 **
yj1936-1937×log(ten) 0.0307 22.6879 **
yj1938-1939×log(ten) 0.0339 26.6975 **
yj1940-1941×log(ten) 0.0328 25.8876 **
yj1942-1943×log(ten) 0.0325 25.1261 **
yj1944-1945×log(ten) 0.0343 25.9873 **
yj1946-1947×log(ten) 0.0376 26.7625 **
yj1948-1949×log(ten) 0.0364 29.2215 **
yj1950-1951×log(ten) 0.0381 28.4383 **
yj1952-1953×log(ten) 0.0362 19.5862 **
yj1954-1955×log(ten) 0.0339 18.7833 **
yj1956-1957×log(ten) 0.0416 28.5900 **
yj1958-1959×log(ten) 0.0377 19.9354 **
yj1960-1961×log(ten) 0.0372 13.5988 **
yj1962-1963×log(ten) 0.0337 9.3925 **
yj1964-1965×log(ten) 0.0591 8.9090 **
yj1966-1967×log(ten) 0.0443 1.9670 *
year dummies yes yes
cross-sections included 1,489 1,489
periods included (years) 41 (1929-1969) 41 (1929-1969)
included observations 22,038 22,038
adjusted R2 0.9785 0.9793
F statistic 16,194.9638 ** 12,870.9100 **
Notes : Base year joined dummy is yj1928-1929.  ** and * respectively denote
significance at the 1 percentage point and 5 percentage points.
Table 3 Cohort effect on wage curves.
3-1
Estimation method panel generalized least squares
Dependent variable log(rwten)
Cross-section random effect
Period (year) pooled (no year dummies inserted)
Indepedent variables coefficient t statistic
c 0.2768 33.7436 **
log(yos) -0.0058 -0.9670
1st lagged yj1928-1929×log(rwten-1) 0.6591 17.8795 **
yj1930-1931×log(rwten-1) 0.7896 16.1036 **
yj1932-1933×log(rwten-1) 0.7523 23.6394 **
yj1934-1935×log(rwten-1) 0.7800 43.1213 **
yj1936-1937×log(rwten-1) 0.7588 48.3209 **
yj1938-1939×log(rwten-1) 0.6790 70.5484 **
yj1940-1941×log(rwten-1) 0.6975 89.0630 **
yj1942-1943×log(rwten-1) 0.6963 68.9359 **
yj1944-1945×log(rwten-1) 0.6504 66.6299 **
yj1946-1947×log(rwten-1) 0.6890 58.7092 **
yj1948-1949×log(rwten-1) 0.6510 79.5999 **
yj1950-1951×log(rwten-1) 0.6307 43.2827 **
yj1952-1953×log(rwten-1) 0.5976 17.6353 **
yj1954-1955×log(rwten-1) 0.5719 17.5231 **
yj1956-1957×log(rwten-1) 0.6604 21.4470 **
yj1958-1959×log(rwten-1) 0.7144 17.9427 **
yj1960-1961×log(rwten-1) 0.6696 13.7528 **
yj1962-1963×log(rwten-1) 0.8186 16.7073 **
yj1964-1965×log(rwten-1) 0.5956 12.3413 **
yj1966-1967×log(rwten-1) 0.6237 3.2366 **
2nd lagged yj1928-1929×log(rwten-2) 0.2417 6.2659 **
yj1930-1931×log(rwten-2) 0.0905 1.7982 *
yj1932-1933×log(rwten-2) 0.1367 4.0860 **
yj1934-1935×log(rwten-2) 0.0974 5.1763 **
yj1936-1937×log(rwten-2) 0.1196 7.3772 **
yj1938-1939×log(rwten-2) 0.2021 20.6744 **
yj1940-1941×log(rwten-2) 0.1755 22.6940 **
yj1942-1943×log(rwten-2) 0.1735 17.1059 **
yj1944-1945×log(rwten-2) 0.2133 22.0184 **
yj1946-1947×log(rwten-2) 0.1680 14.5816 **
yj1948-1949×log(rwten-2) 0.2124 27.8185 **
yj1950-1951×log(rwten-2) 0.2254 15.3842 **
yj1952-1953×log(rwten-2) 0.2485 6.9029 **
yj1954-1955×log(rwten-2) 0.2702 7.7968 **
yj1956-1957×log(rwten-2) 0.1670 5.1291 **
yj1958-1959×log(rwten-2) 0.0862 2.0206 *
yj1960-1961×log(rwten-2) 0.1212 2.3170 *
yj1962-1963×log(rwten-2) -0.0564 -1.0533
yj1964-1965×log(rwten-2) 0.2478 4.5225 **
yj1966-1967×log(rwten-2) 0.1691 0.7385
interaction of year dummy and yos: dy×yos yes
cross-sections included 1,433
periods included (years) 39 (1931-1969)
included observations 18,786
adjusted R2 0.9853
F statistic 15,966.5019 **
Notes : ** and * respectively denote significance at the 1 percentage point and 5
percentage points.
Table 4 Wage regressions: decomposition of wage growth to somatic characteristics, schooling, experience, and employer learning.
4-1 4-2 4-3 4-4
Estimation method panel generalized least squares
Dependent variable log(rw)
Cross-section random effect
Period (year) pooled (no year dummies inserted)
Indepedent variables coefficient t  statistic coefficient t statistic coefficient t statistic coefficient t statistic
c -7.7667 -52.1003 ** -3.3614 -46.0811 ** -9.5217 -62.2208 ** -3.4895 -50.1303 **
log(hgt) 0.9889 4.8336 ** 0.8989 7.5772 **
log(yos) 3.0015 46.0606 ** 1.0541 34.0716 ** 3.7511 57.5712 ** 1.1400 40.3621 **
psw 0.4091 44.0165 ** 0.5185 56.1763 ** 0.3730 41.9127 ** 0.5044 55.1572 **
log(exp) 2.5869 48.7570 ** 0.4717 68.3996 ** 3.2810 57.5520 ** 0.3871 51.0462 **
log(ten) 0.3719 87.4122 ** 1.1359 36.3905 ** 0.4711 113.1134 ** 1.5802 46.9811 **
log(hgt)×log(exp) -0.3351 -4.4371 **
log(hgt)×log(ten) -0.3788 -7.4829 **
log(yos)×log(exp) -0.9376 -40.6812 ** -1.2597 -52.0852 **
log(yos)×log(ten) -0.3381 -23.6940 ** -0.4868 -31.7665 **
dcy -0.4059 -3.6801 ** -0.4247 -3.7687 ** -0.2035 -2.3178 * -0.2212 -2.4282 *
dcy×log(ten) 0.1496 3.2500 ** 0.1545 3.3118 ** 0.0504 1.3983 0.0547 1.4871
sy -0.3353 -19.4785 ** -0.3537 -20.1587 ** -0.2591 -17.8232 ** -0.2906 -19.3064 **
sy×log(ten) 0.1423 19.6474 ** 0.1465 20.0213 ** 0.0933 15.8574 ** 0.1033 17.2067 **
dct -0.2985 -9.6032 ** -0.3345 -10.5615 ** -0.2028 -6.3568 ** -0.1967 -5.9452 **
dct×log(ten) 0.0967 7.8552 ** 0.1043 8.3757 ** 0.0868 6.6855 ** 0.0865 6.5389 **
dc 0.3518 21.8293 ** 0.2909 17.7911 ** 0.5078 38.2092 ** 0.3858 28.4641 **
dc×log(ten) -0.1375 -18.3605 ** -0.1328 -17.4057 ** -0.2372 -38.2659 ** -0.2193 -34.3170 **
cross-sections included 1,537 1,537 1,219 1,219
periods included (years) 41(1929-1969) 41(1929-1969) 31(1939-1969) 31(1939-1969)
included observations 23,172 23,172 16,486 16,486
adjusted R2 0.7332 0.7256 0.8560 0.8447
F statistic 4,899.0627 ** 4,715.3657 ** 6,534.1880 ** 5,978.7079 **
Notes :   ** and * respectively denote signifnicance at the 1 percentage level and  at 5 percatage level.  Some samples lack the information
about somatic characteristics.
5-1
Estimation method panel generalized least squares
Dependent variable log(rw)
Cross-section random effect
Period (year) pooled (no year dummies inserted)
Indepedent variables coefficient t statistic
c 1.0566 17.7992 **
log(yos) 0.0550 2.1187 *
log(pre) -0.3464 -13.4326 **
log(ten) 0.6582 63.8259 **
log(yos)×log(pre) 0.1932 17.0794 **
log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1987 -43.1558 **
interaction of year dummy and yos: dy×yos yes
cross-sections included 1,489
periods included (years) 41(1929-1969)
included observations 22,038
adjusted R2 0.9720
F statistic 16,994.0390 **
Table 5 Interaction of schooling previous epxerience/tenure: without conrol of
cohort effects.
Notes : ** and * respectively denote significance at the 1 percentage point and 5
percentage points.
6-1
Estimation method panel generalized least squares
Dependent variable log(rw)
Cross-section random effect
Period (year) pooled (no year dummies inserted)
Indepedent variables coefficient t statistic
c 1.2964 81.2347 **
log(pre) -0.4820 -39.1322 **
log(ten) 0.4613 47.0426 **
yj1928-1929×log(yos)×log(pre) 0.1284 4.6176 **
yj1930-1931×log(yos)×log(pre) 0.2534 5.8745 **
yj1932-1933×log(yos)×log(pre) 0.1460 8.1160 **
yj1934-1935×log(yos)×log(pre) 0.2532 27.1733 **
yj1936-1937×log(yos)×log(pre) 0.2721 35.5659 **
yj1938-1939×log(yos)×log(pre) 0.2591 40.6432 **
yj1940-1941×log(yos)×log(pre) 0.2722 44.5023 **
yj1942-1943×log(yos)×log(pre) 0.2794 44.2258 **
yj1944-1945×log(yos)×log(pre) 0.2576 39.1331 **
yj1946-1947×log(yos)×log(pre) 0.2464 35.3082 **
yj1948-1949×log(yos)×log(pre) 0.2804 50.3265 **
yj1950-1951×log(yos)×log(pre) 0.2643 46.0690 **
yj1952-1953×log(yos)×log(pre) 0.2635 39.7984 **
yj1954-1955×log(yos)×log(pre) 0.2575 37.7142 **
yj1956-1957×log(yos)×log(pre) 0.2325 42.3614 **
yj1958-1959×log(yos)×log(pre) 0.2064 37.2464 **
yj1960-1961×log(yos)×log(pre) 0.2010 35.3942 **
yj1962-1963×log(yos)×log(pre) 0.1943 34.5856 **
yj1964-1965×log(yos)×log(pre) 0.2470 39.5138 **
yj1966-1967×log(yos)×log(pre) 0.2103 26.6658 **
tenure yj1928-1929×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0328 -3.2824 **
yj1930-1931×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0893 -5.9885 **
yj1932-1933×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0404 -4.9408 **
yj1934-1935×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0941 -15.9109 **
yj1936-1937×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1072 -19.7566 **
yj1938-1939×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.0998 -20.5446 **
yj1940-1941×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1154 -24.2276 **
yj1942-1943×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1236 -25.8829 **
yj1944-1945×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1204 -25.1002 **
yj1946-1947×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1183 -24.0692 **
yj1948-1949×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1513 -33.5383 **
yj1950-1951×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1505 -32.5777 **
yj1952-1953×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1623 -31.7789 **
yj1954-1955×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1619 -33.6151 **
yj1956-1957×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1622 -36.3124 **
yj1958-1959×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1661 -36.7977 **
yj1960-1961×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1744 -35.5727 **
yj1962-1963×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1864 -35.9705 **
yj1964-1965×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.1939 -26.6854 **
yj1966-1967×log(yos)×log(ten) -0.2286 -20.1566 **
dcy, sy, dct, dc yes
dcy×log(ten), sy×log(ten), dct×log(ten), dc×log(ten) yes
interaction of year dummy and yos: dy×yos yes
cross-sections included 1,489
periods included (years) 41(1929-1969)
included observations 22,038
adjusted R2 0.9808
F statistic 12,494.1280 **
previous
experience
Table 6 Interaction of schooling and previous epxerience/tenure: robustness check with control of cohort
and other effects.
Notes : ** denotes significance at the 1 percentage point.
Appendix List of variables.
variable definition
rw real daily wage.
hgt relative height when employed by the firm:  (observed hight)/(average hight at hisage in the year).
yos years of schooling: (years of schooling)+1.
psw postwar education generation (12 years old or younger in 1947). dummy variable
exp experience in the labor market: age−(6+yos)+1.
pre previous experience: age−(6+yos+ten)+1.  Note that every sample emolyee had
worked at the firm until the last year of his record.
yj19XX dummy of year joined: =1 if joined the firm in 19XX. dummy variable
yj19XX-19YY dummy of year joined: =1 ifjoined the firm from 19XX to 19YY. dummy variable
dy19XX year dammy. dummy variable
ten tenure: (years after employed by the firm)+1.
dcy 1 if completed Development Center for Youth (from 1927 to 1935). dummy variable
sy 1 if completed School for Youth (from 1935 to 1948). dummy variable
dct 1 if completed Development Center for Technician (from 1939 to 1946). dummy variable
dc 1 if completed Development Center (from 1946 to 1973). dummy variable
Notes : The source of average height is  the School Health Statistics surveyed by the Ministory of Education,
Science, Sports and Culture (http://www.e-stat.go.jp/).
